Vinaya Studies

Anālayo
Vinaya Studies
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Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts (DILA) Series

In 1994, Master Sheng Yen (1930–2009), the founder of Dharma Drum Buddhist College, began publishing the series of the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies. The purposes of publishing this series were to provide a venue for academic research in Buddhist studies supported by scholarships from the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, to encourage top-quality Buddhist research, and to cultivate an interest in Buddhist research among the readership of the series. Moreover, by encouraging cooperation with international research institutions, Master Sheng Yen hoped to foster the academic study of Buddhism in Taiwan.

In keeping with this vision, in order to promote different aspects of exchange in academic research, we at Dharma Drum Buddhist College began to publish three educational series in 2007:
- Dharma Drum Buddhist College Research Series (DDBC-RS)
- Dharma Drum Buddhist College Translation Series (DDBC-TS)
- Dharma Drum Buddhist College Special Series (DDBC-SS)

In July 2014, the Taiwanese Ministry of Education deliberated on the merging of the Dharma Drum College of Humanities and Social Sciences and the Dharma Drum Buddhist College into the newly formed Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts (DILA).

The new DILA incarnations of the former three series are now:
- Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts Research Series (DILA-RS)
- Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts Translation Series (DILA-TS)
- Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts Special Series (DILA-SS)
Among our goals is the extensive development of digital publishing and information to adapt to the interactive and hyperconnective environment of the Web 2.0 age. This will allow research outcomes to be quickly shared and evaluated through the participation of individual users, through such media as blogs, shared tagging, wikis, social networks and so on. Our hope is to work towards developing an open environment for academic studies (perhaps called Science 2.0) on digital humanities that will be more collaborative and efficient than traditional academic studies. In this way, the Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts will continue to help foster the availability of digital resources for Buddhist studies, the humanities, and the social sciences.

Bhikṣu Huimin  
President, Dharma Drum Institute of Liberal Arts  
15 August, 2014
Foreword

There are a few scholars, perhaps in any field, about whom one jokes, "He writes more than I read!" Ven. Anālayo is certainly one of those about whom such comments are sometimes made. The sheer volume of his scholarly output is astonishing, but what is much more important, and impressive, is that the quality of this large body of work reaches the very same high level.

The previous volumes in this series of publications deal, serially, with the four collections of Āgamas; in the present volume, we are treated to a selection of studies focused on Vinaya literature. Both are areas of inquiry to which Ven. Anālayo has contributed fundamentally. (And just to even it out, so to speak, he has certainly not neglected the third of the three sections of the classical canon, the Abhidharma, the origins of which have recently drawn his attention as well.)

It is no doubt far too early to start thinking about evaluating Ven. Anālayo's contributions retrospectively. However, it is important and valuable to have his collected contributions on a selection of topics, of which the present volume forms one piece. It is not the purpose of this appreciation to offer either a summary of these contributions, or a critique of the points with which I might not entirely agree. Rather, my purpose here is to reflect for a few moments on the accomplishments of the author, and the significance of his contributions to the field of Buddhist Studies.

Although there have been, naturally, a number of notable exceptions in the roughly 150-year history of modern Buddhist Studies (one may think in the first place of F. Weller or E. Waldschmidt, for instance), it remains the fact that most (non-East Asian) scholars working on South Asian Buddhism, and particu-
larly those focused on so-called Early Buddhism, make scant use
of the treasures preserved in Chinese translations. It is often re-
peated that the – again we are forced to say "so-called" – Thera-
vāda traditions have preserved the only intact and complete canon
in an Indian language, namely in Pāli. While this may be true (in
fact, the notion of completeness is much less lucid than it might
seem), it is hardly a compelling reason to ignore the invaluable
materials preserved in the first place in Chinese.

Ven. Anālayo, German by birth, trained and ordained as a monk
in the Sri Lankan tradition, also began his studies with a solidly
Pāli-centric orientation, but he came, over the course of several
years, to realize the central importance of Chinese. A long series
of publications has introduced, with exquisite philological rigour,
the riches preserved in the first place in Chinese translations of
Indian Āgama texts. In the present volume the emphasis is on the
Vinaya. Or rather, we must very carefully and precisely use the
plural: the Vinayas, for we have naturally not merely the single
Vinaya tradition in Pāli, but a number in Chinese, in addition to the
Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya preserved also in Sanskrit and Tibetan,
and consequently paid much more attention by a greater number
of (non-East Asian) scholars than those collections preserved only
(or almost only) in Chinese.

The Vinaya literature is a vast ocean, the expanses of which
have been, so far, rather little explored by modern scholars. Ven.
Anālayo does not attempt any general synthesis or overall intro-
duction.¹ What he does instead is, without fuss or unduly drawing
attention to the fact, study particular problems on the basis of all
the relevant evidence. What has first drawn the author's attention
to any individual problem is not always easy to discern, but a few
patterns are clear, including an ongoing interest in the status of

¹ For a survey one might best see the recent contribution by Clarke 2015.
nuns within the Buddhist monastic communities. In several contributions published here, he explores issues related to the order of nuns, the foundation of the order, and proper ordination. This, of course, has a vital present-day aspect, since there continue to be discussions, sometimes quite passionate, about the legality of female monastic ordination in the cases where traditional ordination lineages have died out.

While the real-world implications of questions around the ordination of women are clear and do not require to be emphasized, one of the most characteristic aspects of Ven. Anālayo's studies is that seemingly no subject he picks up is treated as if it were a mere historical artefact, dead to today's world. Quite the opposite: he seems always to see the texts as alive and vital, as relevant, either actually or potentially, in the present. All scholarship, when reliable, can be seen as providing bricks, smaller or larger, out of which the larger edifice of knowledge about the past is being built. It may be that in some cases, or in many cases, the scholar who produces the brick in question is actually not quite sure – or may not have even considered the question of – where that brick should fit.

I have the impression that Ven. Anālayo always has a large architectural drawing in his mind, that he always has a clear idea of where he thinks his bricks might fit. For this reason, perhaps, a large amount of his scholarly output is fundamental: he offered several years ago, for instance, two gigantic volumes in which he systematically compared the Pāli Majjhima-nikāya with its parallels in Chinese, Sanskrit, and Tibetan. His approach to specific issues is the same: he attempts to exhaust the textual (and archaeological, and art-historical) sources, drawing upon all relevant materials. This, not incidentally, has recently been visible also in his concerted efforts to emphasize that exclusive focus on the Āgama/Nikāya corpus on the one hand or the Vinaya corpus on the other
can lead to unsatisfactory evaluations of both; only by looking holistically at all sources are we able to make positive steps forward.

The present volume collecting a few contributions on issues related to *Vinaya* studies, if it (re)introduces the author's efforts to examine this literature scientifically – dispassionately, but with passion, if one may say that – will doubtlessly contribute to an increased appreciation for, and promote engagement with, the literary sources of the Buddhist past, and increase our appreciation for their continued vitality into the present. I am delighted, therefore, to welcome its publication.

Jonathan A. Silk
7 November, 2016
Introduction

The present volume contains revised papers on topics related to *Vinaya*, thereby forming a companion volume to my collected papers with *Dirgha-āgama* studies (2017b), *Madhyama-āgama* studies (2012e), *Samyukta-āgama* studies (2015e), and *Ekottarika-āgama* studies (2016a).

Contents

I begin in the first chapter by exploring the legal significance of a breach of a *pārājika* rule, arguing that this indeed entails a loss of communion with the Community of the four directions and needs to be differentiated from the question of residential rights in a particular monastery. I also examine the implications of the absence of the *śikṣādattaka* observance, recorded in several other *Vinayas*, from the Theravāda *Vinaya*.

The next three chapters are dedicated to the significance of *Vinaya* narrative. My main point here is to draw attention to the distinct nature of this type of text and its functioning as part of the overall educational project of *Vinaya* teachings, which inevitably circumscribes the use to which such literature can be put by the modern scholar. My concern is in particular to draw attention to the need to avoid the naïve assumption that *Vinaya* stories are necessarily accurate records of what actually happened on the ground in Indian Buddhist monasticism.

The second and third chapters are based on narratives that come with the first and third *pārājika*. These are the tales of Sudinna, who engaged in sexual intercourse with his former wife to ensure the continuity of his family lineage, and the story of how a recommendation by the Buddha of contemplation of the body as
bereft of beauty led a substantial number of monks to engage in this practice with such lack of balance that they eventually committed suicide. In the course of attempting to understand the genesis of the dramatic tale of the mass suicide of monks I also explore the overlap that exists between discourse and Vinaya literature, which implies that Vinaya texts are best read in conjunction with the discourses, rather than on their own.

My suggestion that Vinaya narrative is hardly a historical record becomes particularly evident with the fourth chapter, in which I take up occurrences of a jātaka tale found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, a tale known in the Pāli tradition as the Vessantara-jātaka. In addition to exploring its function as a Vinaya narrative, my interest in this chapter is also to understand the roots of the basic trope of Vessantara's gifts in brahminical conceptions and how this trope came to be accommodated to its present Buddhist setting.

With the fifth chapter I turn to the account of the foundation of the order of nuns, based on a version of this episode extant as an individual translation into Chinese. Elsewhere I have studied the different versions of this event in detail, wherefore in the present chapter I instead examine the convergence of soteriological inclusiveness, institutional androcentrism, and ascetic misogyny in this text and in comparison with attitudes towards women in modern Thailand.

In the following chapter I critically survey four theories proposed by other scholars concerning the foundation history of the order of nuns, concluding that each of these fails to provide a convincing explanation of this particular Vinaya narrative due to a failure to take into account all of the relevant textual material, be this out of oversight or due to flawed methodological premises.

\[1\] Anālayo 2016b.
The narrative of the first saṅgīti is the topic of the seventh chapter, in particular the decision of the assembled monks not to follow the Buddha's permission to abolish the minor rules, a decision which sets the stage for an attitude towards Vinaya rules as the unchangeable essence of the monastic life.

The same attitude also has considerable impact on the controversy surrounding the revival of bhikkhunī ordination, which I study in detail in the eighth and longest chapter in this book. Whereas the previous chapters are based on revised versions of a single article, in this chapter I combine extracts from several studies I published on this topic, in an attempt to clarify a rather complex situation. My study covers elements influencing traditional Theravāda monastic attitudes, the legal dimensions of the situation that do enable such a revival, and problems with seeing the revival of bhikkhunī ordination as a move for gender equality.

The final part of the book consists of three appendices. The first of these is just an annotation to my translation of a passage from the Cullavagga in chapter 8, in which I left the term paṇḍaka untranslated, wherefore in the appendix I survey contributions made by other scholars on the significance of the term. Related to the same chapter is also second appendix, in which I take up the quest for Vinaya texts by the pilgrim Fǎxiǎn (法顯). This forms part of the background to the transmission of the bhikkhunī ordination lineage from Sri Lanka to China. The appendix surveys Fǎxiǎn's search for Vinaya texts to be brought back to China for translation. In the last appendix I then study the significance of the term āsava, whose removal forms the rationale underpinning the promulgation of Vinaya rules.

Conventions

Since a considerable part of my target audience will be familiar mainly with the Pāli canon, in what follows I employ Pāli terminol-
ogy, except for anglicized terms like "bodhisattva", "Dharma", or "Nirvāṇa", without thereby intending to take a position on the original language of the texts in question or to suggest that Pāli language is in principle preferable. I hope this will facilitate access to my studies by those who are more familiar with Pāli terms.

In the notes to those parts of the studies that contain translations from the Chinese, I discuss only selected differences in relation to the Pāli and other parallels. Abbreviations in such translations are usually found as such in the Chinese original. These are reproduced with an ellipsis. Instructions in the original that indicate the need to recite the elided text are given in italics.

In the translations, I use square brackets [ ] to indicate supplementation and angle brackets ⟨ ⟩ to mark emendation. In order to facilitate cross-referencing, I use square brackets in subscript to provide the pagination of the original Chinese text on which the translation is based and the pagination of the original paper, as well as superscript for its footnote or endnote numbering, whenever these differ from the present annotation. In chapter 8 I have dispensed with this practice, since this chapter combines revised and rearranged extracts from five different articles, making it no longer feasible to refer to the original pagination and annotation. When quoting text editions, I have occasionally standardized or adjusted the punctuation.

**Translation Terminology**

When translating, I have attempted to stay close to the terminology adopted by Bhikkhu Bodhi in his renderings of the Pāli equivalents, to facilitate comparison. In the case of 皈磁, equivalent to dukkha, however, I simply keep the Pāli term, which at times

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2 Due to revision of the original papers, at times these references to the earlier pagination or footnote numbering are not in sequential order.
does stand for outright "pain", but on many an occasion refers to "unsatisfactoriness", where translations like "suffering" or "pain" fail to convey adequately the sense of the passage in question. The standard rendering of bhagavant in Chinese is 世尊, literally "World Honoured One", in which case I follow Bhikkhu Bodhi's translation of the corresponding Pāli term and adopt the rendering "Blessed One". For 慈 I use the Pāli equivalent mettā, and for 漏, corresponding to āsava, I employ the rendering "influx".

Titles of the original publications:
"Bhikṣuṇī Ordination" (2017a); cf. below p. 221ff.
"The Case of Sudinna: On the Function of Vinaya Narrative, Based on a Comparative Study of the Background Narration to the First pārājika Rule" (2012a); cf. below p. 35ff.
"The Cullavagga on Bhikkhunī Ordination" (2015a); cf. below p. 221ff.
"Fa-xian and the Chinese Āgamas" (2010c); cf. below p. 315ff.
"The First Saṅgīti and Theravāda Monasticism" (2015c); cf. below p. 201ff.
"The Going Forth of Mahāpajāpatī Gotamī in T 60" " (2016c); cf. below p. 143ff.
"The Legal Consequences of pārājika " (2016d); cf. below p. 7ff.
"The Mass Suicide of Monks in Discourse and Vinaya Literature" 2014e); cf. below p. 69ff.
"On the Bhikkhunī Ordination Controversy" (2014f); cf. below p. 221ff.
"Purification in Early Buddhist Discourse and Buddhist Ethics" (2012f); cf. below p. 325ff.
"The Revival of the Bhikkhunī Order and the Decline of the sāsana" (2013d); cf. below p. 221ff.

3 For a more detailed discussion of the term āsava cf. below p. 326ff.
"Theories on the Foundation of the Nuns' Order, A Critical Evaluation" (2008); cf. below p. 167ff.
"Theravāda Vinaya and bhikkhunī Ordination" (2017d); cf. below p. 221ff.
"The Vessantara-jātaka and Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya Narrative" (2016g); cf. below p. 113ff.
"The Validity of bhikkhunī Ordination by bhikkhus Only, According to the Pāli Vinaya " (2017e); cf. below p. 221ff.

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I am indebted to Naomi Appleton, Bhikkhu Ariyadhammika, Achim Bayer, Bhikkhu Bodhi, Bhikkhu Brahmāli, Roderick Bucknell, Adam Clarke, Shayne Clarke, Alice Collett, Martin Delhey, Bhikkhunī Dhammadinnā, Richard Gombrich, Ann Heirman, Ute Hüsken, Ayako Itoh, Bhikṣunī Jampa Tsedroen, Petra Kieffer-Pülz, Tse-fu Kuan, Amy Langenberg, Kester Ratcliff, Michael Running, Martin Seeger, Jonathan Silk, Ken Su, Bhikkhunī Tathālokā, Fumi Yao, Stefano Zacchetti, and Monika Zin for comments, suggestions, or assistance offered in regard to one or more of the articles collected in this volume, and to the editors of the respective journals and volumes for permission to reprint the material.
Pārājika

Introduction

In this chapter I explore the legal consequences a fully ordained monk (and by implication a fully ordained nun) incurs on violating a pārājika rule. I begin with the relevant indications given in the code of rules (prātimokṣa/pātimokkha) itself, before turning to the story of a monk who had apparently violated such a rule and still tried to participate in the uposatha observance, the fortnightly recital of the code of rules.

Next I take up the difference between being no longer considered part of the community of fully ordained monks and the residential right to live in a particular monastery, since I believe that keeping in mind this distinction can avoid possible confusions about the significance of being "in communion", saṃvāsa. Based on this distinction, I then examine which of these two meanings corresponds to the legal consequences of a breach of a pārājika regulation and evaluate the šikṣādattaka observance mentioned in a range of Vinayas, together with the conclusions that can be drawn from its absence in the Theravāda Vinaya.

Reciting the Code of Rules

In what follows I take as my example the case of a fully ordained monk who voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse without having beforehand given up his ordained status. According to a stipulation that forms part of the formulation of the first pārājika in the code of rules of the different Buddhist monastic traditions,


acting in this way turns a monk into one who is "not in communion", asamvāsa.\(^2\)

The idea of a monk who is not in communion can be illustrated with an episode that depicts an immoral monk seated in a gathering of monks assembled for the recital of the code of rules.\(^3\) Below I translate one of two similar Madhya-āgama accounts of this episode.

Versions of this event can be found in several discourses from different transmission lineages, among them also two discourses in the Aṅguttara-nikāya and the Udāna respectively, and as well in various Vinayas, including the Theravāda Vinaya. This situation exemplifies a general overlap between discourse and Vinaya texts in the Theravāda tradition and elsewhere, which makes it advisable not to consider Vinaya literature on its own as the only source for supposed in-house information on what took place on the ground in the Indian Buddhist monastic traditions.\(^4\) Instead, both types of text are best read in conjunction.

In the present case, the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya in fact does not report the episode and instead refers to the Poṣadha-sūtra of the (Mūlasarvāstivāda) Madhya-āgama for the full story.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) The translated extract is found in MĀ 122 at T I 610c25 to 611a22. The same episode occurs in MĀ 37 at T I 478b16 to 478c13.

\(^4\) Cf. in more detail below p. 90ff.

\(^5\) Dutt 1984c: 107,2 and its Tibetan counterpart in D 1 ga 182a3 or Q 1030 nge 174b5; Chung and Fukita 2011: 18 report that this Mūlasarvāstivāda discourse version is "not yet known to exist in any language". Dhirasekera 1982/2007:
Again, whereas Buddhaghosa's *Manorathapūraṇī* and Dhammapāla's *Paramatthadīpanī* offer detailed information on this episode, this is not the case for the *Vinaya* commentary *Samantapāsādikā*.\(^6\) This implies that the reciters both of the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* and of the Pāli commentaries expected their audience or readership to use *Vinaya* material alongside discourse material, rather than in isolation. [3]

**Translation (1)**

At that time, it being the fifteenth of the month and the time to recite the code of rules, the Blessed One sat in front of the community of monks on a prepared seat. Having sat down, the Blessed One in turn entered concentration and with the knowledge of the mind of others he surveyed the minds in the community. Having surveyed the minds in the community, he sat silently until the end of the first watch of the night.

Then one monk got up from his seat, arranged his robes over one shoulder and said, with his hands held together towards the Buddha: "Blessed One, the first watch of the night

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300f seems to have misunderstood this reference in the Sanskrit version, leading him to conflate it with the ensuing text that concerns another episode and then to conclude that the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* account differs substantially from the other versions. J.-H. Shih 2000: 142 note 40 repeats these mistaken conclusions, even though p. 146 note 49 she shows awareness of the fact that the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya* does not report the episode.

\(^6\) Cf. below p. 12 note 9. Regarding the authorship of the *Samantapāsādikā*, von Hinüber 2015a: 425 explains that, "though attributed to Buddhaghosa, his authorship can be safely ruled out. The form and content of the introductory verses are quite different from the beginning of both the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* and the *Atthasālinī*, and so is the method followed in this commentary"; cf. also Kieffer-Pülz 2015: 431. On aspects of the interrelation between the *Samantapāsādikā* and the commentaries on the four *Nikāyas* cf. Endo 2013: 244–247.
has already come to an end. The Buddha and the community of monks have been sitting together for a long time. May the Blessed One recite the code of rules."

Then the Blessed One remained silent and did not reply. Thereupon the Blessed One kept sitting silently further through the middle watch of the night.

Then that one monk got up again from his seat, arranged his robes over one shoulder and said, with his hands held together towards the Buddha: "Blessed One, the first watch of the night has passed and the middle watch of the night is about to end. The Buddha and the community of monks have been sitting together for a long time. May the Blessed One recite the code of rules."

The Blessed One again remained silent and did not reply. Thereupon the Blessed One kept sitting silently further through the last watch of the night.

Then that one monk got up from his seat for a third time, arranged his robes over one shoulder and said, with his hands held together towards the Buddha: "Blessed One, the first watch of the night has passed, the middle watch of the night has also come to an end, and the last watch of the night is about to end. It is near dawn and soon the dawn will arise. The Buddha and the community of monks have been sitting together for a very long time. May the Blessed One recite the code of rules."

Then the Blessed One said to that monk: "One monk in this community has become impure."

At that time the venerable Mahāmoggallāna was also among the community. Thereupon the venerable Mahāmoggallāna thought in turn: [4] 'Of which monk does the Blessed One say that one monk in this community has become impure? Let me enter an appropriate type of concentration so that, by way of
that appropriate type of concentration, by knowing the minds of others, I will survey the minds in the community.'

The venerable Mahāmoggallāna entered an appropriate type of concentration so that, by way of that appropriate type of concentration, by knowing the minds of others, he surveyed the minds in the community. The venerable Mahāmoggallāna in turn knew of which monk the Blessed One had said that one monk in this community had become impure.

Thereupon the venerable Mahāmoggallāna rose from concentration and went in front of that monk, took him by the arm and led him out, opening the door and placing him outside [with the words]: "Foolish man, go far away, do not stay in here. You are no longer in communion with the community of monks, since you have now already left it, no [longer] being a monk." He closed the door and locked it.

Study (1)

After Mahāmoggallāna has taken the culprit out, the Buddha explains that he will no longer recite the code of rules for the monks and, in the version translated above, describes how someone might falsely pretend to be a true monk until his companions recognize him for who he truly is.\(^7\) In most of the versions that I will be considering below, the Buddha instead delivers a comparison of qualities of the monastic community with those of the ocean.

Except for the Madhyama-āgama tradition, an individually translated discourse, and the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya,\(^8\) other accounts

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\(^7\) This part of MĀ 122 has parallels in AN 8.10 at AN IV 169,1 (preceded by a different episode) and T 64 at T I 862c20 (preceded by the same episode); cf. also SHT IV 412 fragments 1 to 5, Sander and Waldschmidt 1980: 21–23.

\(^8\) MĀ 37 at T I 478b17, T 64 at T I 862b10, T 1435 at T XXIII 239b8; for a juxtaposition of MĀ 37 and the relevant part in T 1435 cf. Chung and Fukita 2011: 320f.
of this episode do not mention that the Buddha had surveyed the minds of the monks in the community, information that is found, however, in the Pāli commentaries.\(^9\) This concords with a general pattern of a commentarial type of information making its way into some canonical texts during the course of transmission until these texts reach a point of closure.\(^10\)

The two Pāli discourse versions that report this episode, together with several parallels preserved as individual translations, a discourse quotation in the Abhidharmakośopāyikā-ṭīkā, as well as the Mahīśāsaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Dharmaguptaka, and Theravāda Vinayas, identify the monk who requested the Buddha three times to recite the code of rules as having been Ānanda.\(^11\)

According to the Aṅguttara-nikāya version (together with the Udāna discourse and the Theravāda Vinaya), an Ekottarika-āgama parallel, and a version preserved as an individual translation, Mahāmoggallāna had first told the monk to leave, and only when the culprit did not take any action did Mahāmoggallāna put him outside forcefully.\(^12\) [5]

In a version preserved as an individual translation the Buddha himself encourages Mahāmoggallāna to survey the assembly in

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\(^9\) Mp IV 112.5 and Ud-a 296.14.

\(^10\) For a more detailed study cf. Anālayo 2010e.

\(^11\) AN 8.20 at AN IV 204,23 (= Ud 5.5 at Ud 51,21 and Vin II 236,4), T 33 at T I 817a10, T 34 at T I 818a13, T 35 at T I 819a8, D 4094 ju 223a2 and Q 5595 tu 254b2, T 1421 at T XXII 180c27, T 1425 at T XXII 447b16, and T 1428 at T XXII 824a8; cf. also Gangopadhyay 1991: 46.

\(^12\) In AN 8.20 at AN IV 205,26 (= Ud 5.5 at Ud 52,19 and Vin II 237,2) and EĀ 48.2 at T II 786b21 Mahāmoggallāna told him three times to leave; in T 35 at T I 819a14 he did so only once. In T 1421 at T XXII 181a8 and T 1428 at T XXII 824a29 Mahāmoggallāna also first told him to leave and then took him outside, but as the narrative does not mention that the culprit did not react to the verbal command to leave, it remains open to conjecture whether this should be seen as implicit in the narration.
order to identify the culprit,\textsuperscript{13} and in another individually preserved discourse the Buddha even asks Mahāmoggallāna to take the immoral monk out.\textsuperscript{14}

Alongside such variations, however, the parallel versions agree on the basic denouement of events. In spite of repeated requests, the Buddha does not recite the code of rules because an immoral monk is present in the community. Mahāmoggallāna spots the culprit and puts him outside of the building in which the uposatha ceremony was to be held. The fact that in all versions the immoral monk is removed from the location where the code of rules is to be recited makes it clear that he must have committed a breach of a pārājika rule. In fact the Pāli versions, for example, qualify him as one who pretended to be celibate but did not practise celibacy.\textsuperscript{15}

The account of this episode in the Aṅguttara-nikāya version has been taken by Juo-Hsüeh Shih (2000b: 144 and 148) to convey the sense that the guilty monk "remained in the community", a supposed inconsistency that then leads her to the assumption that perhaps

at the very outset of Buddhist monasticism, even the gravest offence may not have incurred expulsion from the Saṅgha in the sense of permanent excommunication involving loss of monastic status.

The passage from the Aṅguttara-nikāya version on which she bases this conclusion describes that the ocean washes any corpse

\textsuperscript{13} T 34 at T I 818a23.

\textsuperscript{14} T 33 at T I 817a28.

\textsuperscript{15} AN 8.20 at AN IV 205,23 (= Ud 5.5 at Ud 52,15 and Vin II 236,25): abrahmacāriṃ brahma-cāripaṭiṁṇaṃ (or brahma-cāripaṭiṁṇaṃ); although in T 1425 at T XXII 447b15 he has rather committed a theft, as already noted by J.-H. Shih 2000: 146.
ashore, comparable to how the monastic community does not associate with an immoral person.\textsuperscript{16} The relevant passage states that even though he is seated in the midst of the community of monks, yet he is far from the community and the community is far from him.

The idea that this implies some sort of leniency for even the gravest offence appears to be based on a misunderstanding of this passage. It simply reflects the situation that prevailed throughout the night before Mahāmoggallāna took action. In fact the previous part of the discourse employs the same expression "seated in the midst of the community of monks" to refer to the immoral monk spotted by Mahāmoggallāna.\textsuperscript{17}

Even though this immoral monk was seated among the community of monks, due to his moral failure he was already not in communion and for this reason was far from the monastic community already at that time.

Instead of implying some sort of leniency, the passage rather helps to clarify that not being in communion does not depend on an action taken by others to expulse an immoral monk, but is something that happens as soon as the pārājika rule is broken. From that moment onwards, the monk is \textit{de facto} no longer a fully ordained monk and \textit{de facto} no longer in communion, even if he pretends otherwise and goes so far as to seat himself among a congregation of monks at the time of the recital of the code of rules.\textsuperscript{18}

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\textsuperscript{16} AN 8.20 abbreviates, wherefore the required passage needs to be supplemented from AN 8.19 at AN IV 202,2; the same is found in Ud 5.5 at Ud 55,14 and Vin II 239,10.

\textsuperscript{17} AN 8.20 at AN IV 205,24 (= Ud 5.5 at Ud 52,16 and Vin II 236,26).

\textsuperscript{18} The nuance of pretending things are otherwise is reflected in the commentarial explanation, Ud-a 297,25, which glosses the expression "seated in the midst of
This is in fact self-evident from the formulation in the different versions of the *pārājika* rule quoted at the outset of this chapter. The condition of *asamvāsa* is incurred right at the time of the moral breach. The principle behind this is that communion obtains only for the morally pure with others who are also pure.\(^{19}\)

An additional argument by J.-H. Shih (2000: 141) involves another discourse in the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, which according to her assessment implies that "one can make good by atonement even for an offence of Defeat."

The passage in question states that "one who has committed a *pārājika* offence will 'paṭikaroti' according to the Dharma."\(^{20}\) The key for understanding this passage is the term *paṭikaroti*, which I have on purpose not translated in order to leave room for first ascertaining its meaning. Another occurrence of the term *paṭikaroti*, together with the same qualification of being done "according to the Dharma", can be found in the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*, after King Ajātasattu had just confessed that he had killed his father. The Buddha replies that in this way the king has performed an action described as *paṭikaroti* "according to the Dharma".\(^{21}\)

Although this verb on its own can at times convey meanings like "make amendment for", "redress", or "atone", since the king was not a monastic (in fact previous to this visit not even a lay follower of the Buddha), in the present context the whole phrase cannot stand for making amendments for a breach of a monastic

\[^{19}\text{Cf. Sn 283: suddhā suddhehi saṃvāsaṃ.}\]

\[^{20}\text{AN 4.242 at AN II 241,22: āpanno vā pārājikam dhammaṃ yathādhammaṃ paṭikarissati.}\]

\[^{21}\text{DN 2 at DN I 85,23: yathādhammaṃ paṭikarosi. This passage and the significance of paṭikaroti have already been studied in detail by Derrett 1997 and Attwood 2008.}\]
rule. Nor does it seem to imply a successful atoning for the evil done, since as soon as the king has left the Buddha tells the assembled monks that, due to being a patricide, Ajātasattu had become unable to realize even the first of the four levels of awakening. Instead, in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta the phrase paṭikaroti "according to the Dharma" has the simple sense of a confession.

The same sense is also appropriate for the Aṅguttara-nikāya passage, which on this understanding describes that "one who has committed a pārājika offence will confess it according to the Dharma." This fits the context well, since the immediately preceding part speaks of not even committing a pārājika offence. Thus the remainder of the passage conveys the sense that, if such persons should nevertheless commit a pārājika, at least they will confess the moral breach according to the Dharma.

Besides, the same Aṅguttara-nikāya discourse uses the identical expression also in relation to one who has committed a pācittiya or else a pāṭidesanīya offence. Since committing a simple pācittiya offence only requires confession, as is the case for a pāṭidesanīya offence, the phrase paṭikaroti "according to the Dharma" here must mean precisely that, namely that the breach is being confessed.

Such confession then marks the difference compared to the monk in the Madhyama-āgama passage translated above, who did not confess and instead pretended to be still in communion by join-

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22 DN 2 at DN I 86,2; cf. also Attwood 2008: 290f.
23 Rhys Davids 1899: 94 translates the phrase as "confess it according to what is right" and Walshe 1987: 108 as "confessed it as is right"; cf. also Radich 2011: 19. In his detailed study of the present episode in relation to the significance of confession, Derrett 1997: 59 explains that those in front of whom such paṭikaroti according to the Dharma takes place "do not forgive or pardon him, nor is the offence atoned for, or washed away. No 'amends' are made … [even] condonation is not in point here … [but] an acceptance occurs like a creditor's issuing a receipt."
ing the community for the recital of the code of rules. In such a case an "expulsion" is required, as quite vividly exemplified by the course of action undertaken by Mahāmoggallāna. The same is not the case for one who confesses "according to the Dharma" a breach of a pārājika rule. In other words, such a breach invariably entails loss of communion, but does not necessarily require expulsion.\(^{24}\)

As explained by Hüsken (1997a: 93), [7]

> if an offender is aware of his pārājika offence and leaves the order on his own initiative, the Vinaya describes no concrete act of expulsion.

The commentary on the Aṅguttara-nikāya discourse explains that a monk who confesses according to the Dharma in this way will be able to continue the monastic life by establishing himself in the condition of being a novice.\(^{25}\) The commentary does not mention other alternatives, giving the impression that this was considered the appropriate course of action in such a situation.

In sum, the suggestions by J.-H. Shih are not convincing. Contrary to her presentation, a monk who has committed a breach of a pārājika rule is indeed "not in communion", as indicated explicitly in the various codes of rules, and such loss of communion has been incurred at the very moment of the breach of morality. Even if such a monk should be seated among the community, as in the passage translated above, in actual fact he is far away from it in the sense of no longer being in communion with them. The ques-

\(^{24}\) This goes to show that there is no need to consider the lack of explicit reference to expulsion in pārājika rules problematic, as done by J.-H. Shih 2000: 132ff, in reply to which Heirman 2002c: 439 clarifies that "the idea of an exclusion is prominently present … [which] the use of the image [of] 'decapitation' further points to as being … permanent"; as noted by ṇāṇatusita 2014: cv, the image of decapitation indeed conveys the gravity of a pārājika breach.

\(^{25}\) Mp III 216,14: sāmaṇerabhūmiyaṁ thassatī ti attho.
tion of expulsion is relevant to such a case, not to one who honestly confesses and in this way acts "according to the Dharma".

The idea that a breach of a pārājika rule somehow should have only limited consequences has also inspired Kovan (2013: 794), who proposes that "the pārājika rules (initiated in and) structured around a communal body are attenuated in solitude." Kovan (2013: 794 note 27) bases this suggestion on contrasting individual suicides of monks like Channa to a mass suicide of monks disgusted with their own bodies.26 In the case of the mass suicide, according to his assessment

in that communal monastic context the Buddha's condemnation of suicide is unequivocal and suggests nothing of the 'particularism' of the responses he appears to bring to the solitary monks in the other cases.

Now the pārājika rule common to the different Vinayas concerns killing someone else as well as inciting someone else to commit suicide or actively assisting in it, and this sets the context for the story of the mass suicide of monks and their receiving assistance in killing themselves. In contrast, Channa as an example of "the solitary monks in the other cases" only killed himself. Thus cases like Channa cannot reflect a restricted scope of pārājika rules, simply because what he did was not a breach of a pārājika offence in the first place. Kovan's idea turns out to be as groundless as the suggestions by J.-H. Shih.

The Community of the Four Directions

The idea that somehow the pārājika rules must have a more limited scope than usually believed leads me on to a suggestion

26 For comparative studies of the case of Channa cf. Delhey 2006 and Anālayo 2010b; on the mass suicide of monks cf. below p. 69ff.
made by Clarke (2009c), according to which committing a pārā-jika offence might only result in a loss of communion with a specific local community.  

His main case study is a tale from the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya about a matricide whose status as a fully ordained monk is revoked by the Buddha when this becomes known. The matricide decides not to return to lay life, but goes instead to a remote place, [8] where a lay supporter builds a dwelling for him that is subsequently also used by other monks. Clarke (2009c: 135) interprets this story as implying that the matricide monk was only no longer a member of the Buddha’s local monastic community. His membership in the Community of the Four Quarters, however, seems not to have been revoked. Accordingly, he was able to go down the road and join (or even start) another (local) monastic community, a place in which he would be 'in communion'.

When evaluating such stories, it needs to be kept in mind, as pointed out by Silk (2007: 277) in his study of this tale, that caution would suggest that such stories be read and interpreted in terms other than as reports of actual incidents which historically led to the promulgation of particular rules of the Buddhist monastic codes.

This pertinent observation reflects a basic requirement when studying Vinaya narrative, namely a clear recognition of the type of information that such literature can and cannot yield. As I will

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27 I already expressed my reservations in this respect in Anālayo 2012a: 418f note 42.

argued in the next two chapters, *Vinaya* narrative is not comparable to a record of case-law precedents in modern judicial proceedings, but much rather serves teaching purposes in the context of legal education in a monastic setting. Keeping this function in mind helps appreciate why in *Vinaya* literature legal discussions and *jātaka* tales go hand in hand.

This in turn implies, however, that caution is indeed required before taking such tales as reliable records of what actually happened on the ground and then drawing far-reaching conclusions, based on them, regarding the significance of being in communion.

Moreover, it seems preferable not to base any conclusions on what is found in a single *Vinaya* only. As succinctly formulated in a different context by Kieffer-Pülz (2014: 62), "general statements on the basis of only one *Vinaya* should belong to the past" of the academic field of Buddhist Studies.

Besides the need for caution when drawing conclusions based on a single *Vinaya* narrative, even taking the tale of the matricide at face value does not give the impression that it was acceptable for a monk who had lost communion to settle this by just proceeding to another local community. The point rather seems to be that the matricide on his own and without any explicitly mentioned precedent or permission decided to go to a distant place, quite probably just because nobody there would know him as a matricide. That a lay supporter builds a *vihāra* for him has no implications regarding the matricide's status as a fully ordained monk, nor does it imply that he is truly in communion with other fully ordained monks.

The same holds for the circumstance that other monks come to dwell in that *vihāra*. All this could equally well have happened if

29 Cf. below p. 35ff and p. 69ff.
30 Cf. below p. 113ff.
he simply pretended to be a regular monk in front of his supporter and the visiting monks, similar to the monk in the passage from the Madhyama-āgama translated above, [9] who pretended to be still in communion.31

If loss of communion had indeed applied only to a local community, one would expect stories reflecting this understanding to be reported in the different Vinayas. Take for example a monk obsessed with seducing women, who could continue having sex with any women he is able to approach as a monk by simply moving from one local community to the next, as soon as he is discovered. Records of such monks, together with the vexation their behaviour caused to well-behaved monks and the outraged reaction of the husbands in particular and the laity in general would surely have stood good chances of inspiring the narrative imagination of the reciters of the different Vinayas.

Moreover, given the peregrination of monks from one monastery to another, the idea of communion with a local community would not be particularly practicable. In concrete terms it would mean that the culprit would be barred from staying at the monastery in which he was dwelling when committing his breach of conduct. A ruling which envisages only loss of residential rights in the local monastery for one who has committed a pārājika

31 In fact Silk 2007: 281 reports that the story continues with one of the disciples, after the death of this monk, trying to ascertain through supernormal powers where his teacher "has been reborn. Using his supernatural sight he is able to survey the realms of transmigration (samsāra), beginning with that of the gods and, when he does not locate him there, descending through the realms of humans, animals and hungry ghosts. It is only when he examines the lowest realm, that of hell, that he discovers his teacher in the great Avīci hell, and upon seeking the cause of his fate learns of his master's earlier crime of matricide." This denouement of the narrative makes it fair to assume that the monk hid his matricide and pretended to be a fully ordained monk.
offence would have failed to fulfil its purposes, which the Vinayas indicate to be restraining badly behaved monks and protecting well-behaved monks, inspiring non-Buddhists and increasing the faith of Buddhists.\textsuperscript{32}

In sum, the consequences that Clarke's suggestion entails on a practical level make it safe to conclude that the idea that a pārājika offence only entails loss of communion with a local community is unconvincing.

Besides, the present tale is not even a case of having committed a pārājika offence, as noted by Clarke (2009c: 126) himself. The killing of the mother took place when the protagonist of the tale was still a lay person. Therefore he had not committed an infraction of any pārājika rule, which only applies to fully ordained monastics. The present case thereby seems similar in this respect to the suggestion by Kovan, which was also based on drawing conclusions about the scope of pārājika based on stories that do not involve a breach of a pārājika rule.

In the present case, as a matricide the monk was held unfit for higher ordination, presumably due to not standing a chance of realizing awakening (comparable to Ajātasattu as a patricide). This leaves hardly any room for considering this story as hinting at loss of communion being only relevant to a local community.

Instead of the approach taken by Clarke, it seems to me that a proper appreciation of the significance of loss of communion for a monk who has committed a pārājika offence lies in the opposite direction, namely by setting aside as irrelevant to this topic the issue of being allowed to live in a particular monastery. This has

\textsuperscript{32} Cf. the Mahīśāsaka \textit{Vinaya}, T 1421 at T XXII 3c1, the Mahāsāṅghika \textit{Vinaya}, T 1425 at T XXII 228c25, the Dharmaguptaka \textit{Vinaya}, T 1428 at T XXII 570c4, the Sarvāstivāda \textit{Vinaya}, T 1435 at T XXIII 1c17, the Mūlasarvastivāda \textit{Vinaya}, T 1442 at T XXIII 629b22 and D 3 ca 28b5 or Q 1032 che 25a6, and the Theravāda \textit{Vinaya}, Vin III 21,17.
no direct bearing on the question of being considered a full member of the community of the four directions, since these two are distinct matters. As explained by Nolot (1999: 59f note 9), [10]

absolute *a-saṃvāsa* is incurred by monks and nuns who have committed a Pār[ā]jika offence and are, as a consequence, deprived of their very status: they are said not to belong to the (universal) Saṃgha anymore.

When Clarke (2009c: 132) reasons: "whether or not one can be expelled from the Community of the Four Quarters is not clear, at least to me", then perhaps a simile from the modern living situation of an academic might help to clarify the situation. Suppose someone passes his PhD exam and starts teaching as an assistant professor, but then is found out to have plagiarized his thesis, whereupon he loses degree and position. Expressed in *Vinaya* terminology, he is not in communion with the community of PhD holders of the four directions. He no longer has the right to apply for a teaching or research position at a university anywhere in the world, claiming to hold a PhD degree, not only at the university where he originally received his degree.

Nevertheless, this does not mean he is forbidden to enter the university grounds. Even at his own university he could still use the library or listen to lectures; if the university has a hostel he might stay overnight or even live there for an extended period of time. But he will not be recognized as holding a PhD degree.

Conversely, someone else can be barred from entering the university grounds for a variety of reasons that need not be related at all to undertaking PhD research or to the degree to be obtained on properly carrying out such research.

The rather distinct situation of residential rights in a local monastery can be further illustrated with an excerpt from another discourse in the *Madhyama-āgama*, which I translate below as a com-
plement to the passage rendered in the first part of this chapter.\(^{33}\) Whereas the first discourse showcases loss of communion with the universal community of the four directions, the present passage rather concerns loss of residential rights in a local community.

**Translation (2)**

At that time the venerable Dhammika was an elder in his native region, being in charge of the *stūpa* and in a position of seniority towards others. He was fierce, impatient, and very coarse, cursing and condemning other monks. Because of this, all the monks of his native region left and went away; they did not enjoy staying there.

Thereupon the male lay disciples of his native region, seeing that all the monks of his native region left and went away, that they did not enjoy staying there, thought in turn: 'What is the reason that all the monks of this native region leave and go away, that they do not enjoy staying here?'

The male lay disciples of his native region heard that the venerable Dhammika, who was an elder in this native region, being in charge of the *stūpa* and in a position of seniority towards others, was fierce, impatient, and very coarse, cursing and condemning other monks. [11] Because of this the monks of his native region all left and went away; they did not enjoy staying there. Having heard it, the male lay disciples of his native region together approached the venerable Dhammika and expelled him. They evicted Dhammika from all monasteries in his native region and made him depart.

Then the venerable Dhammika, having been expelled by the male lay disciples of his native region, having been evicted

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\(^{33}\) The translated extract is taken from MĀ 130 at T I 618b21 to 618c5.
from all monasteries in his native region and made to depart, took his robes and bowl and went travelling.

**Study (2)**

A parallel to this discourse preserved in the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* differs in so far as Dhammika is first told by the lay disciples to go to another monastery still within his native district. Once he is there, he behaves as earlier, so that the same happens again and again, and this eventually results in him being expelled from all monasteries in his native region. Another difference is that the *Āṅguttara-nikāya* version does not refer to *stūpas*, a topic to which I will return at the end of this chapter.

Although Dhammika had been expelled from all monasteries of his native region, he remained a fully ordained monk. Expressed in *Vinaya* legal terminology, he remained "in communion". In whatever monastery outside of his native region he went to stay next, he had the right to act as a fully ordained monk and would have been not only allowed, but even expected to participate in the recitation of the code of rules. Although what he had done led to his expulsion from the monasteries of his native region, his behaviour as such did not involve a breach of any *pārājika* rule.

Another noteworthy feature of this case is that those who expelled the monk Dhammika were laymen. In other words, not only are residential rights in a local monastery quite different from loss of communion, but decisions regarding such residential rights need not even be taken by monks, as according to the present episode the laity can do so as well.

In fact, dwelling in a monastery is not an exclusive privilege of fully ordained monks (or fully ordained nuns in the case of a nunnery). Monasteries can also serve as a residence for novices,

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34 AN 6.54 at AN III 366,23.
for example, and at times lay people also live in a monastery. Due to the restrictions placed on fully ordained monastics by their rules, they require the assistance of the laity for certain tasks that they cannot perform themselves, which makes it convenient if such a lay helper also stays in the same monastery.\(^{35}\)

Thus a fully ordained monk who has lost his status of being in communion can still continue to live at the very same monastery in which he was staying when his breach of morality happened. His being no longer in communion only refers to his inability to function any longer as a fully fledged member of the monastic community in legal matters, such as participating in the recital of the code of rules, to stay with the earlier example. Having lost the right to consider himself a fully ordained monk, he can either live at the monastery as a lay disciple or else, as mentioned in the commentary on the Āṅguttara-nikāya passage related to the phrase paṭikaroti "according to the Dharma", he can do so having become a novice.

Clarifying the basic distinction between residential permit in a particular monastery and legal permit to perform legal actions as a fully ordained monk also helps to put into perspective the śikṣā-dattaka observance, a provision found in the Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśasaka, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Sarvāstivāda Vinayas applicable to the case under discussion in this chapter, namely a monk who has committed a breach of the pārājika rule on celibacy.\(^{36}\)

Clarke (2009b: 27), to whom we are indebted for a detailed study of this topic, reports that the "śikṣādattaka is effectively reduced to a position of subservience and humility". In several Vinayas, such

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\(^{35}\) One example, discussed in Silk 2008: 42ff, is the accepting of donations; on the legalistic dimensions this issue can acquire in the tradition cf. also below p. 225f.

\(^{36}\) On the śikṣādattaka observance cf. also Greene 2017.
relegation to a lowly, but still clearly monastic, position is likewise evident in the requirement that he sit below the most junior of the monks, and above the novices ... he is not to take charge of a novice, ordain a monk, or admonish nuns ... [or else] not permitted to discuss the Vinaya, recite or listen to recitations of the Prātimokṣa.

If this is the case, then it is not clear why Clarke (2009b: 8) concludes that the śikṣādattaka "is most certainly not expelled (or 'no longer in communion' [asaṃvāsa])". As I hope my earlier discussion would have clarified, being expelled needs to be differentiated from being no longer in communion. The former only applies to certain cases, the latter to all instances of a breach of a pārājika rule. Regarding the latter, restrictions of the type mentioned in the quote above do imply that the śikṣādattaka is no longer in communion, asaṃvāsa.37

Since the status of being śikṣādattaka does imply a loss of communion and a demotion in status, this in turn means that, if a fully ordained monk voluntarily engages in sexual intercourse, this still results in his loss of being in communion. Such loss in turn affects the institutional reality of Buddhist monasticism in its internal and external dimensions, inasmuch as he can no longer legitimately perform the function of perpetuating this monastic institution by conferring valid ordination on others and would also no longer be reckoned a meritorious recipient of individual gifts by lay donors comparable to the way in which this was the case before he had broken a pārājika rule.

Now as Clarke (2009c: 116) rightly notes, "a monk who has sex does not necessarily commit a pārājika offence." An example

37 This has already been pointed out by Sujato 2009: 122 note 192: "the śikṣā- dattaka (sic) is not, contra Clarke, 'in communion'." Wood 2012: 157f and Kaplan 2016: 261, however, unreservedly accept Clarke's conclusions.
would be when a monk is mentally deranged or possessed and therefore not considered accountable for what he does. But when Clarke backs up his statement in his note 6 by stating: "Take, for instance, the case of the pärājika penitent or śikṣādattaka", followed by reference to his paper on this topic, then this does not seem to work as a case of sexual intercourse not being considered a breach of the respective pärājika rule.

The śikṣādattaka observance, in the way summarized by Clarke based on what is common among the different Vinayas that recognize this procedure, only institutionalizes the way in which a monk who has offended against a pärājika rule can continue to live in robes at a monastery in a position situated between novices and fully ordained monks. It does not change the nature of the pärājika offence itself. One who has actually committed a pärājika offence is still no longer considered a fully ordained monk according to these Vinayas. In fact, if these Vinayas did not recognize that having sex, etc., entails a breach of the pärājika rule, there would hardly have been any need for them to get into devising the śikṣādattaka option in the first place.

38 This would also hold for the case story related to the śikṣādattaka observance in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya where, according to the detailed study by Clarke 2009b: 16, the narrative unfolds in such a way that the monk is not considered to have committed a full breach of the pärājika in the first place. Therefore his being depicted as eventually becoming an arhat and with such attainment then being reinstated from the śikṣādattaka level to that of a fully ordained monk would have no consequences for our understanding of what an actual pärājika breach implies, comparable in this respect to the matricide story from the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya discussed earlier. Since neither involves a breach of a pärājika, they have no direct bearing on what such a breach entails. The present story only implies that in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya the śikṣādattaka observance could also be conferred on those who, due to the circumstances of their deed, were not reckoned as having committed a full breach of the pärājika rule prohibiting sexual intercourse.
The institution of the śikṣādattaka is in this respect comparable to the option of becoming a novice, mentioned in the Pāli commentary, by confessing that one has lost one's status as a fully ordained monk. In its treatment of the first pārājika, the Pāli Vinaya mentions that one of several ways a fully ordained monk can disavow his status is by declaring himself to be a novice.\(^{39}\) Since at the time of ordination he had received first the going forth, corresponding to novice ordination, and then the higher ordination as a monk, this means he is giving up only the higher ordination, not the going forth. This straightforward option does not appear to have been felt to be in need of further legislation.

The same option is found in the Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Mūlasarvāstivāda, and Sarvāstivāda Vinayas.\(^{40}\) All of these Vinayas recognize that a fully ordained monk, if he

\(^{39}\) Vin III 27,7: sāmaṇero ti maṃ dhārehi ti, preceded at Vin III 24,28 by the expression sāmaṇerabhāvam patthayamāno. Thanks to the discussion by Kieffer-Pülz 2015/2016 of the different situation for nuns in this respect, I became aware of the proposal by Paṇḍita 2016 of two modes of disavowal of one's higher ordination, of which the supposedly earlier one did not involve any of the ways described in the passage under discussion. Now the function of a word explanation (padabhājanīya) in the Vinaya is to explain and define, not necessarily to promulgate something new. Thus the present word explanation only implies that the listed ways of disavowal of one's higher ordination are from now on those considered legally valid from the viewpoint of pārājika casuistic. It does not imply that these ways had never been in use earlier and only came into existence with the arising of this commentary. Besides, the two examples Paṇḍita 2016: 2f gives for the supposedly earlier mode of disavowal concern a monk who mistakenly believes he has lost communion and a nun who has lost communion and concealed it; neither is a case of a successful disavowal of the higher ordination.

\(^{40}\) The Dharmaguptaka Vinaya, T 1428 at T XXII 571b19, the Mahāsāṅghika Vinaya, T 1425 at T XXII 236a1, the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya, T 1421 at T XXII 4c2, the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1422 at T XXIII 630b10 and D 3 ca 31b4 or Q 1032 che 27b6, and the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, T 1435 at T XXIII 2c2.
wishes to disavow his higher ordination, can do so simply by declaring himself to be a novice from now on. This is similar to what can happen when a fully ordained monk confesses according to the Dharma that he has violated a pārājika rule. The main difference is that when a monk just decides to become a novice, for whatever reason, he can in principle at a later time take full ordination again and thereby become once more one who is in communion. If he becomes a novice after having committed a breach of a pārājika rule, however, the option of becoming a fully ordained monk again is not open to him. He will no longer be able to become one who is fully in communion.

Thus what happened with the šikṣādattaka observance appears to be that some Vinayas carved out a more institutionalized version of the basic option of remaining in robes at a level below that of a fully ordained monk. This might have occurred in response to an increase in the number of such cases, leading to a felt need for more explicit legislation that also ensures that one who is willing to confess and thereby incur the resultant loss of status as a fully ordained monk can ensure that, following his demotion in status, at least he will be placed within the monastic hierarchy above the level of a novice. In several Vinayas the attractiveness of admitting a breach of a pārājika seems in fact to have been increased by offering a few additional privileges, while at the same time keeping the šikṣādattaka observance still clearly distinct from the condition of being fully in communion.

This in turn gives the impression that the difference between the Theravāda Vinaya, which does not know the šikṣādattaka observance, and the other Vinayas, which do contain this option, is mainly one of increasing degrees of institutionalization. It does not appear to be a difference in principle. [14]

Therefore Clarke (2009b: 26) is probably right when he envisions, as one of several possibilities, that
the Pāli *Vinaya*‘s apparent ignorance of this ecclesiastical provision may, in this case, reinforce the premise that it represents an older tradition, one which was transmitted to Sri Lanka prior [to the arising of the šikṣādattaka observance].

Clarke (2009b: 31) compares the case of the šikṣādattaka observance to that of monastic regulations related to *stūpas*. Similarly to the discourse on Dhammika translated above, where the Pāli version did not mention the role of its monk protagonist in relation to *stūpas*, the Pāli *Vinaya* also has no reference to regulations in this respect. This led Schopen (1989: 95) to the proposal that

the total absence of rules regarding *stūpas* in the Pāli *Vinaya* would seem to make sense only if they had been systematically removed.

This suggestion earned him immediate criticism. Instead, the absence of any such reference rather shows that the Theravāda *Vinaya* was already closed by the time *stūpas* acquired sufficient importance to require monastic legislation.

The same suggests itself for the šikṣādattaka observance, in that the move to institutionalize the monastic status of a monk who has broken a pārājika rule would have occurred only at a time when the Theravāda *Vinaya* was already closed.

Lest I be misunderstood, with the foregoing suggestion I do not intend to promote the attitude of considering the Pāli *Vinaya*


42 Sujato 2009: 234–237 comes to the same conclusion regarding *stūpa* regulations and the šikṣādattaka training. However, he also brings in the sikkhamānā training in this conclusion, where I find his overall treatment of this topic unconvincing; for two points of disagreement cf. Anālayo 2015a: 412 note 11 and 2016b: 97f note 23.
as invariably earlier than its parallels. In fact in my comparative studies of the narratives related to the first and third pārājikas in the next two chapters I argue that the Theravāda account has incorporated later elements and is therefore definitely not the earliest version at our disposal.\textsuperscript{43}

However, these are narratives shared by the different Vinayas, which thus stand good chances of representing a common early core, unlike stories found only in some Vinayas.\textsuperscript{44} Such instances show that the Theravāda Vinaya is as much a product of the appropriation of later ideas and the embellishment of stories as the other Vinayas. Yet, due to the idiosyncrasies of its transmission, in the case of this particular Vinaya the process of incorporation appears to have come to a comparatively earlier point of closure than in the case of its Indian brethren.

This in turn is significant for evaluating material not found in the Theravāda Vinaya at all, such as regulations concerning stūpas and the śikṣādattaka observance. Recognizing the significance of such absence makes it possible to construct a reasonable chronology of developments in Indian Buddhist monasticism.

In other words, it seems fair to conclude that rules on stūpas and the śikṣādattaka observance are not found in the Theravāda Vinaya quite probably because they reflect comparatively later concerns. They can certainly be considered as later concerns than, for example, the notion that committing a pārājika offence equals immediate and definite loss of communion with the community of fully ordained monastics in the four directions, a notion reflected explicitly already in the code of rules of the different Vinaya traditions. \textsuperscript{[15]}

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. below p. 35ff and 69ff.

\textsuperscript{44} On the principle that parallelism points to a common early core, contrary to the position taken by Schopen 1985, cf. Anālayo 2012d.
Conclusions

A fully ordained monk who willingly engages in sexual intercourse, without having given up his ordained status, is no longer in communion. Such being no longer in communion happens right at the time of the moral breach and does not have a necessary relationship to the monk's residential rights in a particular monastery. It is only when the distinction between residential rights and membership in the community of the four directions is lost sight of that the clear-cut connection between a breach of a pārājika and the ensuing loss of communion becomes blurred.

The Aṅguttara-nikāya does not recognize a form of atonement for pārājika, just as the śikṣādattaka observance does not imply a re-evaluation of the nature of a pārājika offence. Instead, the latter only involves an institutionalization of an option already available earlier, namely to continue to live at a monastery in robes but without all the privileges that come with full ordination.

Similarly to the case of stūpa regulations, the absence of references to the śikṣādattaka observance in the Theravāda Vinaya points to the relatively later date of the corresponding legislations.